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Torts
Torts; medical malpractice
Business and Professions Code Article 11 (commencing with §800),
Article 2.3 (commencing with §2123), §2372 (repealed); Article 11
(commencing with §800), §§2100.2, 2100.5, 2100.6, 2100.7,
2103.8, 2101.5, 2101.6, 2101.7, 2122, Article 2.3 (commencing
with §2123), Article 2.4 (commencing with §2124.5), §§2372,
2372.1, 2601.5, Article 8.5 (commencing with §6146) (new);
§§125.5, 2100, 2101, 2101.6, 2116, 2119, 2123.1, 2123.2, 2123.3,
2123.9, 2123.10, 2124, 2124.2, 2124.45, 2124.7, 2361, 2361.5,
2362, 2364, 2372, 2372.5, 2436, 2454, 2456, 2458, 6146 (amended); Civil Code §§ 3333.1, 3333.2 (new); §§ 43.8, 3333.1, 3333.2
(amended); Code of Civil Procedure Chapter 5 (commencing with
§364), §§667.7, 674.7, Title 9.1 (commencing with §1295) (new);
§§340.5, 364, 667.7, 1094.5, 1295 (amended); Insurance Code §§
108.5, 1858.05, 1858.15, 11587, 11588 (new); §§4040, 11588,
11890, 11895, 11896, 11897, 11898, 11900, 11902, 11902.2,
11903, 11904 (amended); Penal Code §830.3 (amended).
AB 1 (Keene); STATS 1975, Ch 1, Second Extraordinary Session
(Effective December 12, 1975)
Support: California Medical Association; California Hospital Association
Opposition: State Bar of California; California Trial Lawyers' Association
SB 24 (Behr); STATS 1975, Ch 2, Second Extraordinary Session
(Effective December 12, 1975)
In 1975, few public issues created more controversy in California
than what is commonly referred to as the "medical malpractice crisis."
Whatever the causes of this problem may have been, the evidence of
its existence became disturbingly apparent. This evidence consisted primarily of two phenomena: tremendous increases, or threats of increases,
in the cost of professional liability insurance, and the medical profession's protest to these increases in the form of "strikes" or work slowPacific Law Journal Vol. 7
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downs. Purportedly because of dramatic increases in both medical malpractice claims [PRELIMINARY REPORT, CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY SELECT COMMITTEE ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, June 1974, at 3], and
judgment awards [id.1, insurance carriers have raised premiums several
hundred percent, and, depending upon the specialty a physician practices, such increases could measure out to a total of annual premiums
in excess of $20,000 [Hiestand, Health Care Loss a Bitter Pill for Pub-

lic, Los Angeles Times, March 2, 1975, pt. VI, at 5]. On May 19, 1975,
Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr. responded to the growing clamor for
governmental relief by calling an extraordinary session of the legislature
to deal exclusively with the formulation of a legislative solution to the
"crisis." Out of this extraordinary session, the legislature passed and
the Governor approved Assembly Bill 1 (Chapter 1)-to be known as
the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (hereinafter referred to
as MICRA). (This analysis also includes references to Senate Bill 24
of the Second Extraordinary Session as it has amended several sections
that were added by Assembly Bill 1. The amendments were for the
most part minor, but do represent the latest version of these sections and
will therefore be indicated when necessary [For an analysis of the substantive provisions of the Joint Underwriting Association, see Review
of Selected 1975 California Legislation, this volume at 473 (Insurance;
medical malpractice)]). As a result of this effort, the legislature has
attempted to impose regulations upon the medical, legal, and insurance
businesses, which are designed to make the reforms necessary to decrease overall compensation, thus theoretically compelling a reduction
in insurance premiums. This reduction in compensation is to be
achieved by three primary reforms: first, by erecting a framework to
assure medical quality, thereby reducing the number of potential lawsuits; second, by imposing various restrictions upon those actions which
are nevertheless pursued; and third, by establishing procedures by which
insurance premium rates may be protested. Accordingly, this legislation has distinct components which will be separately analyzed.
Legal Actions for ProfessionalNegligence

The Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act has made several significant changes in the law with respect to medical negligence actions.
Primarily these reforms seem designed to accomplish two goals: (1)
to expedite identification and resolution of claims; and (2) to make
amounts and payment of compensation awards more economically manageable. From the outset, it should be noted that this portion of the
Selected 1975 California Legislation
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MICRA applies only to specified health care providers and only to actions for "professional negligence." "Health care provider" is defined
as any licentiate of a healing arts board, Osteopath, Doctor of Chiropractic, clinic, health dispensary, or health facility licensed pursuant to
the Health and Safety Code. This definition also includes ie legal representatives of a health care provider [CAL. Bus. & PROF. CoDE §6146
(c)]. "Professional negligence" is defined as a negligent act or omission by one of the above persons or entities in the rendering of professional services which causes personal injury or wrongful death. The
services provided must be within the scope of the health care provider's
license and not in violation of any restriction imposed by a licensing
agency or licensed hospital (§6146). Apparently, because of the scope
of this definition, an action brought under a legal theory other than negligence will not be regulated by this part of the MICRA-for instance,
an action for battery on the grounds of a lack of "informed consent."
Furthermore, if the injury occurs while the health care provider is acting
outside of the scope of a license or hospital regulation, legal redress of
such an injury may apparently be pursued without regard to the restrictions of this part of the MICRA. Consequently, it would seem that in
such a case general tort law should be followed.
1. Time limitations
In an attempt to expedite the resolution of medical injury claims,
Chapter 1 has amended Section 340.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure
to shorten the applicable statute of limitations under which an action
must be brought. All actions for negligence must be commenced within
three years of the date of the injury or one year after the date the injury
was or should have been discovered, whichever occurs first. The absolute ceiling of three years may be tolled only upon proof of fraud, intentional concealment, or by the presence of a non-therapeutic foreign body
in the claimant.

The major change in the statute of limitations, how-

ever, relates to actions by minors, which now must be brought within
three years of the injury unless the child is under six years of age, in
which case the action must be commenced within three years or by time
the child reaches the age of eight years, whichever is a longer period
of time. The statue may be tolled only if the child's parent and the
defendant or the defendant's insurer have committed fraud or collusion
in failing to bring a timely action. Prior to the enactment of Chapter
1, the statute of limitations was tolled for the entire period of minority
insofar as this condition was one of the tolling disabilities specified
by Section 352 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 7
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Prior to amendment, Section 340.5 provided for a four year statute
of limitations, which was tolled only if the defendant failed to disclose
any act, error, or omission of which he or she knew or should have
known. The prior statute of limitations also applied to actions for rendering professional services without consent-a provision absent from
this chapter. Hence, if a plaintiff proceeds on an intentional tort theory,
i.e. battery, on the grounds of lack of "informed consent" [See, e.g.,
Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505
(1972)], this new statute of limitations apparently would not be applicable.
In addition to the restricted statute of limitations for negligence actions, Chapter 1 has added Section 364 to the Code of Civil Procedure
to require a potential plaintiff to give the named potential defendants
at least 90 days notice that he or she intends to file an action. This
notice must explain the legal basis of the claim and describe the injury
allegedly sustained. Although this provision is couched in terms which
suggest compliance is mandatory, Section 365 specifically states that failure to comply will not invalidate the action; rather it will only expose
an attorney who fails to give such notice to disciplinary measures by the
State Bar.
2. Damages
Perhaps one of the most significant changes made by Chapter 1 is
the ceiling limitation it places on "general damages." Although the new
Section 3333.2 of the Civil Code clearly establishes the plaintiff's right
to recover noneconomic losses (i.e. compensation "for pain, suffering,
inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement and other nonpecuniary damage"), any such losses exceeding $250,000 will not be compensated. This limitation is specifically and exclusively applicable to
actions for "professional negligence," and thus does not restrict actions
for damages brought on other theories.
Another potential limitation on damages is the abolition by Chapter
1 of the "collateral source" rule in actions for professional negligence.
Previously, evidence of insurance benefits paid to an injured plaintiff
was not admissible to reduce his or her damages. The reason for this
exclusion generally has been a policy of not allowing a wrongful defendant to benefit from the financial prudence of the plaintiff [Hrnjak v.
Graymar, Inc., 4 Cal. 3d 725, 484 P.2d 599, 94 Cal. Rptr. 623
(1971)]. Apparently noting a more significant policy consideration in
reducing judgments by preventing ostensible "double recoveries," the
Selected 1975 California Legislation
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legislature has added Section 3333.1 to the Civil Code to render evidence of benefits paid to the plaintiff from Social Security, state or federal income disability, workers' compensation, or health, sickness, or income disability insurance admissible in actions for professional negligence. Additionally, if the plaintiff belongs to a group insurance plan
which reimburses costs of health care, the fact of the existence of these
benefits may be introduced int6 evidence. Section 3333.1 does not
seem to apply to any benefits paid through life insurance, or other nonreimbursement benefits. If the defendant does introduce such evidence,
the plaintiff is entitled to show evidence of the amounts he or she has
paid to secure the benefits. Furthermore, Section 3333.1 specifically
forbids the source of these benefits from recovering any amount from
the plaintiff, nor may it be subrogated to the rights of the plaintiff
against the defendant.
Chapter 1 has made another significant change in the law by adding
Section 667.7 to the Code of Civil Procedure to allow the periodic payment, as opposed to "lump sum" payment, of certain judgments. If an
award equals or exceeds $50,000 in future damages (defined infra), either party may request the court to order the judgment, in whole or part,
to be paid in a periodic fashion. The court must issue the order if requested. If the judgment debtor is not adequately insured, the court
must require the posting of security adequate to assure full payment of
the award. Such an order must specify (1) the recipient(s), (2) the
amount of each payment, (3) the interval between payments, and (4)
the number of payments to be made. Section 667.7 speaks only in
terms of judgments, and has no language indicating an intent to provide
for periodic payment of settlements or awards in arbitration. In the
event the debtor continually fails to make the payments, the court may
hold the debtor in contempt and order the payment to the creditor of
all damages caused by such failure, plus costs and attorneys fees.
"Future damages" are damages for future medical treatment, care or
custody of the injured party, loss of future earnings, loss of bodily function, or future pain and suffering of the judgment creditor (§667.7
(e) (1)). It is important to distinguish future from present damages
because periodic payments are allowed only if future damages equal or
exceed $50,000. Hence, if the plaintiff's pain and suffering are substantial, but not necessaribly of a continuing nature, the "periodic payment" scheme is inapplicable.
Section 667.7 further provides certain procedures relating to the modification of orders for periodic payments. The only specified circumPacific Law Journal Vol. 7
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stance which will support a modification is the death of the judgment
creditor. However, future damages which constitute future earnings of
the judgment creditor are not to be reduced upon his or her death, but
must be paid to surviving dependents in a fashion to be determined by
the trial court. In addition, Section 667.7(f) provides a statement of
legislative intent indicating a desire to preclude any "potential windfall"
which might result after the death of the judgment creditor. That is,
if a plaintiff is awarded substantial damages for care and treatment over
an extended period of time and then dies shortly after such amount has
been paid, there is no compelling reason or policy to allow that sum
to go to someone other than to whom it was intended. Hence, in keeping with this policy, any party may request, upon the death of the plaintiff, a modification of the periodic payment order to delete those
amounts allocated for the specific care of the plaintiff.
Apparently, this provision of the MICRA was included because payments of large sums of money could place some insurance carriers in
a precarious financial position which could only be alleviated by drastic
increase in the premium rate. Evidently, periodic payments may not
only obviate the "windfall' effect that a lump sum judgment may have
under certain circumstances, but may also tend to permit a more manageable and predictable insurance environment.
3.

Attorney's fees

Perhaps one of the most controversial provisions of the MICRA is
the regulation of the contingency fee arrangement; a compensation device generally utilized by plaintiffs' attorneys in malpractice actions as
an alternative to a fee-for-service approach. Just what effect the contingency fee has upon the amount or cost of malpractice claims is uncertain [See REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE, DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE,

Wash-

ington D.C., DHEW Publication No. (OS) 73-88, January 16, 1973,
Appendix, The Medical Malpractice Legal System, at 113-20]. Apparently, however, the legislature has concluded that the possible extraordinary fee that might develop from a large percentage of a large judgment has detrimental societal effects. Accordingly, Chapter 1 has
added Section 6146 to the Business and Professions Code to create a
so-called "sliding scale" contingency fee system which provides for a
percentage rate which is inversely proportional to the amount of the
judgment.
An attorney is permitted to charge his client, in an action for professional negligence, (1) 40 percent of the first $50,000 "recovered" (deSelected 1975 California Legislation
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fined infra), (2) 33V percent of the next $50,000 recovered (3)
25 percent of the next $100,000 recovered, and (4) 10 percent of any
amount in excess of $200,000 recovered. This schedule applies
whether recovery is achieved through settlement, arbitration, or judgment. "Recovered" means the net amount of the judgment after deduction of legal costs incurred in settlement or prosecution of the claim.
Specifically not deductible are medical expenses incurred by the plaintiff
and the attorney's office overhead cost or charges. If the judgment is
paid in periodic payments [CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §667.7], Business
and Professions Code Section 6146 (b) requires the court to place a total
value on the payments, based on the plaintiff's projected life expectancy,
and to compute attorney's fees from the result. This section is silent,
however, on how payment is to made under such circumstances. Apparently, the attorney may obtain a portion of each payment or agree
with his client upon some other method. Furthermore, although this
system applies to any damages recovered from "judgment, settlement,
or arbitration," the periodic payment scheme specifically applies only to
"judgments."
Finally, Section 6146(c) directs the Board of Governors of the State
Bar to recommend to the legislature, by July 1, 1976, an equitable
method for regulating the compensation of defense counsel "consistent
with the policies embodied within this article [8.5] regarding regulation
of plaintiff's attorney's fees." Although there is no specific policy declaration contained in the MICRA regarding attorney's fees, one assumes
at least one consideration is that the injured party should receive as
much of the judgment as is possible. Presumably this consideration is
absent for defense costs, and therefore exactly what policy is "embodied"
in the MICRA which may apply to both attorneys seems unclear. Another policy consideration is perhaps that the contingency fee encourages
lawsuits against physicians. Regardless of the truth of this belief, certainly this idea is inapplicable to defense counsel.
4.

Arbitration

Contractual agreements to submit to arbitration any future controversy arising out of medical services has been seen by some as one viable
solution to the medical malpractice dilemma [See REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, DEPT. OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION AND WELFARE, Washington, D.C., DHEW Publication No.

(OS) 73-88, January 16, 1973 at 91 (hereinafter cited as HEW REPORT); PRELIMINARY REPORT, CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY SELECT COM-
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1974, at 14, 57]. Although
California Supreme Court
by
the
such contracts have been upheld
[Doyle v. Guiluicci, 62 Cal. 2d 606, 401 P.2d 1, 43 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1965)], the expected utility of this device has not materialized [See
HEW REPORT, supra, Appendix at 227n.11]. Whether or not arbitration is the panacea some claim is not an issue specifically addressed
by the legislature, but it has provided in the MICRA the framework for
those who would see it as a useful alternative to litigation.
Chapter 1 has added Section 1295 to the Code of Civil Procedure
to allow arbitration clauses which will control actions for professional
negligence in medical services contracts so long as certain formalities are
complied with. Such a contract must include as its first article the following:
"It is understood that any dispute as to medical malpractice, that
is as to whether any medical services rendered under this contract
were unnecessary or unauthorized or were improperly, negligently
or incompetently Tendered, will be determined by submission to arbitration as provided by California law [CAL. CODE Civ. PROC.
§1280 et seq.], and not by lawsuit or resort to court process except
as California law provides for judicial review of arbitration proceedings. Both parties to this contract, by entering into it, are giving up their constitutional right to have any such dispute decided
in a court of law before a jury, and instead are accepting the use
of arbitration."
In addition, immediately above the signature line, the following notice
must appear in bold red type:
NOTICE: BY SIGNING THIS CONTRACT YOU ARE
MITTEE ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, June

AGREEING TO HAVE ANY ISSUE OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE DECIDED BY NEUTRAL ARBITRATION AND
YOU ARE GIVING UP YOUR RIGHT TO A JURY OR
COURT TRIAL. SEE ARTICLE 1 OF THIS CONTRACT.

It is perhaps worthy of note that this section purportedly regulates only
those contracts for the arbitration of professional negligence, yet the
mandatory clauses clearly contain language to cover other theories of
recovery.
Such a contract will also regulate controversies regarding payment for
medical services (§1295(c)), will bind minors if signed by the parent
or guardian, and may be rescinded by written notice given within 30
days of signature of the contract. Section 1295(e) specifically states
that if all of these formalities are complied with, the contract is not a
contract of adhesion nor unconscionable.
Selected 1975 California Legislation
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Medical Quality Assurance
1. Board of Medical Quality Assurance
Chapter 1 has amended Section 2100 of the Business and Professions
Code to establish the Board of Medical Quality Assurance (hereinafter
referred to as Board) under the auspices of the Department of Consumer
Affairs, which replaces the former Board of Medical Examiners
(§2100.2). The Board consists of three divisions; Medical Quality, Licensing, and Allied Health Professions-each having distinct responsibilities to assure proper licensing and appropriate discipline. Although
the ultimate power to prosecute violators of the provisions of Chapter
1 is expressly given to the Board (§2116), revocation of certificates is
a function of the Division of Medical Quality, and such an action may
be taken only by a vote of at least five of the seven members (§2119).
The Division of Licensure is mandated by this legislation to develop,
by January 1, 1977, standards for continuing medical education. Furthermore, the licensing board must require physician and surgeon certificate holders to demonstrate satisfaction of continuing education requirements every four to six years. Chapter 1 does not specify how
"satisfaction" is to be measured, and imposes no outright requirement
of recertification by examination (§2101.6). However, Business and
Professions Code Section 2122 does provide that the Division of Medical
Quality must recommend to the Governor and legislature by July 1,
1977 a program of "individual performance evaluation," which may be
in the form of recertification.
2.

Medical Quality Review Committees

In order to implement a statewide system of medical quality assurance, Chapter 1 has established 14 local "medical quality review committees." This has been achieved by totally rewriting Article 2.3 (commencing with §2123) of the Business and Professions Code, which formerly encompassed provisions of "district review committees" under the
Board of Medical Examiners. The primary function of each committee
is to provide local review of the quality of medical practice within a distinct geographical area. Each committee is made up of a combination
of physicians, public members, and non-physician licentiates of a healing
arts board (§2123.2). This composition is an apparent attempt to provide a certain measure of "peer review" while not making such review
an exclusive responsibility of the medical profession.
Each medical quality review committe, pursuant to Section 2124 of
the Business and Professions Code, possesses the following powers and
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 7
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duties: (1) to initiate a review of any certificate holder as well as to
investigate any matter submitted to it by the Division of Medical Quality;
(2) to investigate any complaint against a certificate holder made by
any person or entity, and report to the complainant within 90 days of
receiving the complaint; (3) to investigate any certificate holder who has
judgments or settlements in excess of $30,000 rendered against him or
her; (4) to determine the existence of unprofessional conduct; (5) to
initiate remedial measures against certificate holders found to be guilty
of unprofessional conduct; and (6) to seek injunctive relief against unprofessional conduct. This section also provides that each committee
must not hear any resulting disciplinary action arising out of an investigation it has conducted (§2124(h)). Cases for investigation may also
be brought to the attention of a committee by, (1) the Division of Medical Quality when the Division has received reports from any court receiving "an unusually high" number of claims against a certificate holder
(§2124.4) or (2) by any physician or surgeon (§2124.45). Such a
report by a physician or surgeon shall remain confidential and is not
admissible before any hearing or court (§2124.45) (other than to initiate the committee's investigation), except in a defamation action where
it is alleged the communication is false and was made with malice
(§2124.45).
Decisions of the committee to suspend a license for less than 30 days
or to impose a license restriction for less than one year are final, unless
reconsideration is granted on a motion of any party or of the committee
(§2123.10). A decision to suspend a license for a period greater than
30 days or any practice restriction exceeding one year must be proposed
to the Division of Medical Quality, which must act upon the recommendation within 90 days (§2123.10).
3.

Discipline
Section 2361 of the Business and Professions Code continues to delineate activities which constitute "unprofessional conduct" with respect
to certificate holders. Such activities include violations of any provisions of the MICRA, gross negligence, incompetence, gross immorality,
moral turpitude, criminal conduct, and "any action or conduct which
would have warranted the denial of the certificate." Furthermore, excessive prescribing of drugs, treatment, or diagnostic procedures is also
considered unprofessional conduct (§2361.5).
Power to take action against a certificate holder for unprofessional
conduct is vested in the Division of Medical Quality. If the Division
has found a certificate holder guilty of unprofessional conduct, it may:
Selected 1975 California Legislation
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(1) revoke the certificate; (2) suspend the right to practice for a period
not exceed one year; (3) place the certificate holder on probation; or
(4) take any other "proper" action.
Business and Professions Code Section 2372.1 is an expression of legislative intent which requires local committees to aid in the rehabilitation
of the practitioner, if his or her unprofessional conduct is attributable
to a lack of continuing education. Furthermore, the committees shall
affirmatively seek out practitioners with educational deficiencies and
formulate corrective measures to cure such shortcomings. Finally, the
Division of Medical Quality, local committee, or hearing officer may also
predicate recertification upon completion of re-examination, order a certificate holder to submit to a complete diagnostic examination, or restrict
the scope or type of practice of the practitioner (§2372.5).
4. Professional reporting
Article 11 has been added to the Business and Professions Code
to require the various governmental boards which regulate the health
professions to maintain central files containing names of all persons who
hold a license or certificate from such board. These files must include
information regarding (1) convictions of crimes or unprofessional conduct, (2) any judgment or settlement in excess of $3000 resulting from
the certificate holder's negligence, error, or omission, (3) certain public
complaints, and (4) denial or restriction of staff privileges (§805). The
contents of this file are to be kept confidential, with access permitted
only to the person involved or his or her counsel (both of whom may
enter exculpatory or explanatory statements in the file), any district attorney, representatives of the Attorney General, or a representative of
the Department of Consumer Affairs. Any review must be for a legitimate purpose relating to the professional activities of the healing arts
licentiate (§800(c)).
Insurance carriers who provide professional liability insurance to a
licentiate must report to the proper licensing agency if they have paid
a claim against the licentiate for death or personal injury exceeding the
sum of $3,000 through settlement or arbitration within 30 days of the
completion of such settlement or service of the arbitration award on all
parties (§801). Similarly, an uninsured licentiate must report any settlement or arbitration award in excess of $3,000 within 30 days of the
agreement or service of the arbitration award. It is incumbent upon
the claimant's attorney to report such an award or agreement if he has
not received notice of its report from the licentiate within 45 days. Any
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 7
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party who fails to comply with this section is guilty of a public offense,
and may be fined up to $500. If the failure to report is knowing and
intentional, the maximum fine is $50,000.
A report must also be made if a licentiate is found guilty of any crime
or is liable for any death or personal injury resulting from negligence,
error, or omission in practice. If the trial judge determines that the
crime or civil liability does not reflect on the defendant's professional
competence or integrity, he or she may dispense with these reporting
requirements (§803).
A complete report under any of the foregoing sections must contain:
(1) the name and business and residential addresses of all claimants or
plaintiffs; (2) the name and business and residential addresses of any
health care provider alleged to have acted improperly; (3) the name of
the insurer of any health care provider listed pursuant to (2) above;
(4) the name of court and docket number of any action; (5) a brief
description of the facts of the case; (6) the names and business and
residential addresses of all attorneys involved; (7) the date and amount
of the final judgment of settlement; and (8) any other information required by agency regulation (§804). Any person named in the report
and notified accordingly must maintain, for a period of three years,
any records he or she possesses which are relevant to the issue (§804).
Reports must also be made by specified health facilities when a licentiate
has either had his or her staff privileges revoked or suspended for a cumulative total of 45 days in any calendar year. If the licentiate resigns,
the report must indicate whether the resignation was voluntary or bargained for.
ProfessionalLiability Insurance
As indicated earlier, the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act
includes legislation affecting three major areas-law, medicine, and insurance. This is so because it is generally believed that the causes of
the "malpractice crisis" have their roots in all of these areas. Accordingly, Chapter 1 has added provisions to the Insurance Code which purport to provide some amount of control over increases in the rate of
malpractice insurance premiums for certain medically related professions and entities.
Any insured physician, osteopath, or health care facility may now,
pursuant to Section 11587 of the Insurance Code, request that carriers
explain any rate they adopt which the insured considers unfair. It is
perhaps significant that the above class of insureds is considerably
smaller than the class of professionals or entities defined as "Health Care
Selected 1975 California Legislation
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Providers" for purposes of malpractice actions (see definition supra).
If the insured considers the explanation inadequate, or if it is not provided at all within 30 days, he or she may petition the insurance commissioner for a public hearing. However, the commissioner is to disregard any petition which complains of a rate increase not greater than
ten percent of the annualized rate previously charged. The commissioner must then determine, within 45 days of the filing of the petition,
whether or not the rate is justified. The insured, or his or her legal
representative, may "reasonably" participate in the examination of the
insurer if an application to do so is filed with the commissioner at least
five days in advance of the hearing. Within 45 days after the hearing,
the commissioner must make a decision, and if the decision is adverse
to the insurer, must indicate the specific provisions of law upon which
he or she relies. The commissioner must either require the rate to be
reduced or have the policy cancelled and unearned premiums returned.
If two or more protests received by the commissioner concern one rate
adopted by an insurer, Section 11587(b) provides that they are to be
considered together. Subsequent petitions which protest substantially
similar grievances as an earlier determined petition are to be automatically subjected to the same disposition. This section automatically expires on December 31, 1977, unless the commissioner finds, at least 30
days prior to the expiration date, that the "malpractice insurance crisis"
still exists, in which case the law is to be renewed on a year-to-year basis.
Finally, Chapter 1 has added Section 11588 to the Insurance Code to
prohibit insurers from charging "excessive or unfairly discriminatory
rates" (as defined in §1852) to medically oriented persons, partnerships,
or corporations solely because they have contracted with patients to arbitrate controversies arising out of the business or professional relationship.
Although the language of this provision is unclear, it would seem logical
that an insurer would hardly charge its clients a greater rate if they plan
to arbitrate claims. Since it is generally believed arbitration can lead to
reduced costs and judgments, this section appears anomolous.
COMMENT
Chapter 1 comprises the legislature's initial response to the medical
malpractice insurance dilemma. Although some may doubt the overall
efficacy of this legislation in "solving" the problem, there is no doubt
that major inroads into the medical malpractice legal system have been
made. Consequently, it appears that the most significant changes made
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 7
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by Chapter 1 are those regulating the legal process of bringing an action
for medical "professional negligence."
From the outset, it seems notable that the legislature chose to specifically regulate only those actions brought upon a theory of "professional
negligence," as defined as a negligent act or omission by a health care
provider in the rendering of professional services which cause personal
injuries or wrongful death. Hence, a "malpractice" action brought on
a theory of an unconsented-to-battery upon the patient, breach of warranty, or other non-negligence theory would apparently be without the
ambit of this legislation. Furthermore, Chapter 1 specifically requires
the act or omission to be within the scope of the health care provider's
license and not in violation of any restriction imposed by a licensing
agency or hospital. Thus, for example, if a patient were injured during
a surgical procedure not authorized by the hospital, redress for such injury should apparently be pursued without reference to the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA).
The restricting of the statute of limitations for actions for professional
negligence is significant in two respects. The time in which an action
must be brought against an adult has been reduced from a four to a
three year maximum, and will be tolled only if there is proof of fraud,
intentional concealment, or the presence of a non-therapeutic foreign
body in the claimant. The prior statute also limited actions based on
unconsented-to treatment (i.e. battery), and could be tolled only if the
defendant failed to disclose any act, error, or omission upon which the
action was based, if the defendant knew or should have known of its
occurance [See complete discussion of old statute of limitations for medical malpractice in Comment, A Four Year Statute of Limitations For
Medical Malpractice Cases: Will Plaintiffs Case Be Barred?, 2 PAc.
L.J. 663 (1971)]. Consequently, the significant changes in Section
340.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure are the reduction of the time limit
by one year, and the removal of the non-negligence theories of liability
to the general tort statute of limitations (§340). The major impact of
this part of the MICRA, however, is the change in the statute of limitations for injuries inflicted upon minors. Existing law (§352) tolls any
statute of limitations during the period of minority. New Section 340.5,
however, specifically includes minors within its provisions and mandates
that actions be brought anywhere from three to eight years after the date
of the injury, unless there has been fraudulent behavior on part of the
child's parent and the defendant or the defendant's insurer. Hence, if
a child's injury occurred, for example, during birth, an action formerly
could have been pursued as many as 18 years later. The policy
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of preserving a minor's right to be compensated for wrongful injury was
considered paramount to the policy of preventing possible injustices that
might occur by allowing a health care provider to be exposed to liability for a considerable length of time [Fay v. Mundy, 246 Cal. App. 2d
231, 237, 54 Cal. Rptr. 591, 595 (1966)]. Now, however, that policy
balance has shifted and the injury in the example drawn would have
to be commenced prior to the child's eighth birthday.
Chapter 1 has therefore placed minors on a near equal footing with
adults relative to the statute of limitations, and since there is nothing
which would constitutionally compel the legislature to toll the statute
during minority, such a law appears perfectly legitimate [See cases collected at 34 Am. JUR. Limitations on Actions §182].
Furthermore, it appears uncertain whether the new statute as applied
to minors will supersede the provisions of Section 29 of the Civil Code
which requires that actions pursued to redress prenatal injuries or injuries incurred during birth must be brought within six years. This provision was enacted to create a cause of action for the benefit of the child
and to protect its interest in the event of its eventual birth [Norman v.
Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 268 P.2d 178 (1954)].
The abolitidn of the collateral source rule by Chapter 1 is an important departure from established California policy. In Hrnjak v. Graymar, Inc. [4 Cal. 3d 725, 484 P.d 599, 94 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971)],
the California Supreme Court reaffirmed the adherence to the rule that
the probative value of evidence of benefits paid to the plaintiff from an
independent source is clearly outweighed by its potential prejudicial effect [Id. at 732, 484 P.2d 599, 604, 94 Cal. Rptr. 623, 628, (citing
CAL. EviD. CoDE §352)]. "[I]f an injured party received some compensation for his injuries from a source wholly independent of the tortfeasor, such payment should not be deducted from the damages which
the plaintiff would otherwise collect from the tortfeasor" [Id. at 729,
484 P.2d at 602, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 626]. Furthermore, a "person who
has invested years of insurance premiums to assure his medical care
should receive the benefits of his thrift. The tortfeasor should not garner the benefits of his victims providence" [Id. at 730, 484 P.2d at 602,
94 Cal. Rptr. at 626]. The court tempered this statement of policy
slightly by adding that such evidence is admissable only if it has "substantial probative value as proof that the plaintiff is a malingerer." The
court must be convinced "that the evidence of collateral source receipts
establishes a strong inference that the plaintiff was motivated by insurance receipts rather than by the actual disabling extent of his injuries"
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lid. at 733, 484 P.2d at 605, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 629]. Despite this fairly
clear reasoning, the legislature has apparently recognized a stronger
value in reducing compensation dollars and avoiding possible "double
recoveries" by allowing the defendant to introduce evidence of collateral
source benefits pursuant to Section 3333.1 of the Civil Code. Perhaps
the policy outlined above is recognized to a certain degree, however, by
allowing the plaintiff to show his expenses in obtaining the insurance
benefits-hence, his "thrift" is apparently appreciated.
In an effort to create greater opportunity to settle a grievance prior
to litigation, Chapter 1 has added Section 364 to the Code of Civil Procedure to require a plaintiff to give at least 90 days notice to a potential
named defendant that he or she intends to sue. Apparently, it is belleved that in the absence of such a requirement, a physician is often
first aware that there exists dissatisfaction with a treatment when he or
she is served with a summons [HEW REPORT, supra, at 37]. Consequently, there is no meaningful opportunity to resolve a dispute prior
to legal action, either for the health care provider or for the patient [Id.].
To insure that this opportunity to negotiate is not obviated by an impending statute of limitations, Section 364(d) provides that if notice
is served within 90 days of the expiration of the statute of limitations,
the statute is extended accordingly. Although there. are no manifest constitutional objections to this provision, it seems unclear why a malpractice action requires any better environment for resolution than other civil
actions.
The provision of the MICRA which seems bound to cause the most
controversy is the regulation of plaintiffs attorney's fees [CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE §6146]. The fact that it was included alone is significant,
but practically the restriction seems quite reasonable. Responding to
studies made both by the California Assembly and the federal government, the legislature has enacted a "sliding scale" contingency fee system
which depreciates the percentage an attorney may collect inversely proportional to the size of the judgment, settlement, or award in arbitration. While it did not decide the merit of the contention that the contingency fee causes spurious lawsuits, the federal study recognized the
potential for a situation where the claimants injury dollars were being
unconscionably swallowed by the high percentage rate [HEW REPORT,
supra, at 34]. Accordingly, the study recommended that a variable
percentage system be adopted in the several states for medical malpractice actions. Pointing to New Jersey's law (by rule of court), the federal
study suggested the following percentages be set as a ceiling for attorney's fees: (1) 50 percent of the first $1,000; (2) 40 percent of the
Selected 1975 California Legislation

559

Torts
next $2,000; (3) 331/ percent of the next $47,000; (4) 20 percent
of the next $50,000; and (5) ten percent of any amount in excess of
$100,000. The California Legislature seemingly did not perceive the
contingency fee as quite the evil that the federal study did in that it
raises the judgment ceiling to 40 percent of the first $50,000, 331/3
percent of the next $50,000, 25 percent of the next $100,000, and ten
percent of any amount in excess of $200,000. Consequently, unless the
judgment is abnormally high, an attorney operating on a contingency
fee system may legally take about $62,000 in fees of a $200,000 adjusted judgment, or 31 percent. As to the power of the legislature to
fix limits on attorney's fees there can be little doubt. Such restrictions
have been enacted to regulate fees in Worker Compensation cases [CAL.
LABOR CODE §4906] and probate actions [CAL. PROB. CODE §9101.
The $250,000 ceiling erected by Chapter 1 with respect to non-economic damages may be subject to a constitutional challenge. Although this law recognizes a plaintiffs right to recover such damages
(i.e. compensation for pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement, and other nonpecuniary damage), the legislative
announcement that such losses cannot exceed $250,000 in any case of
"professional negligence" is conceivably an arbitrary confiscation of a
protected interest of the claimant in contravention of due process, or
may violate a victim's right to equal protection of the laws in that such
a provision arbitrarily creates a class of specific tort victims which is accorded different treatment than is applicable to victims of other types
of torts. Due process essentially requires that life, liberty, or property
should not be deprived by a state without notice and an opportunity to
be heard [See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-79
(1970)]. If the limitation on damages mandated by Chapter 1 is to
be found constitutionally wanting, it would seem necessary to recognize
complete compensation for general damage as one of those protected
rights.
Limitation on damages is not a novel solution to problems in California. For example, in the Worker's Compensation area, the law provides only for special damages (recovery related to wage earning capacity) from the employer tortfeasor. The policy supporting this restriction is that the purpose of the Worker's Compensation scheme is
not to make the plaintiff whole for his or her loss, but to prevent the
worker and his or her family from becoming "public charges" [See,
e.g., West v. Industrial Accident Commission, 79 Cal. App. 2d 711,
721, 180 P.2d 972, 978 (1947)]. Similarly, damages for libel against
a publisher are limited by Civil Code Section 48a to special damages
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if a retraction has been timely published. In construing the constitutionality of Section 48a, the California Supreme Court, in Werner v.
Southern Cal. etc. Newspapers [35 Cal. 2d 121, 216 P.2d 825 (1950)],

held that the legislature, consistent with due process, may strike a compromise between the desirability of fully compensating a victim of tortious conduct and the need to protect a necessary public service from
the potential harm of excessive general damages. The court indicated
that the restriction provision in Section 48a was a "reasonable substitute"
for general damages in view of the potential censrial ramifications of
huge general damage awards [35 Cal. 2d at 126, 216 P.2d at 828].
It would seem that the $250,000 limit is likewise a "reasonable substitute" for "full" general damages in light of the manifest policy considerations of easing the malpractice crisis. Therefore, it does not seem
arbitrary for the legislature to limit damages, even if considered a "property right," if there is a superior and rational public policy reason for
doing so. Consequently, although there is arguably a legally protected
interest being taken without notice or an opportunity to be heard,
it is outweighed by the superior interest of the state incurring the causes
of the malpractice crisis.
Equal protection requires primarily that similarly situated persons or
classes of persons be treated equally under the law [Gray v. Whitmore,
17 Cal. App. 3d 1, 94 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1971)]. That is, the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment forbids the states to legislate in a manner which results in "different treatment be[ing] accorded to persons placed by a statute into different classes on the basis
of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute" [Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971)]. Therefore, legislation limiting victims of "professional negligence," a tort, to a maximum amount of damages conceivably creates a distinction, or classification, apart from other
types of tort victims. Thus, it would arguably appear that as a class
of persons "similarly situated," tort victims cannot be constitutionally bifurcated with one group being treated differently than another. Classifications which do not impede a fundamental freedom or which are not
"suspect" (e.g., race) generally are reviewed by a less stringent standard
than those that do. It would seem that a statute which restricts a class
of tort victims to a maximum amount of damages would not necessitate
utilization of the strict approach, but rather requires the showing of a
"reasonable relation" between the classification and the purpose of the
statute [Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1954); Brown
v.Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973)].
That is, "courts must determine the question of whether the classificaSelected 1975 California Legislation

Torts

tions drawn in a statute are reasonable in light of its purpose" [McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964)]. Therefore, a future
court will have to determine if the classification of victims created by
the $250,000 damage limit of Chapter 1 is reasonable in light of the
compelling purpose of easing the malpractice crisis in California. Unless a specific factual situation is patently unjust as a result of this legislation, it would seem likely that such a court would indeed find the
scheme reasonable and constitutional.
Torts; wrongfd death
Code of Civil Procedure §377 (amended).
AB 428 (Ingalls); STATS 1975, Ch 334
Support: State Bar of California; California Trial Lawyers' Association
Prior to this amendment, Section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure
limited the right to bring an action for wrongful death to the statutory
heirs of a decedent under the rules of intestate succession and to dependent parents of the decedent. It also distinguished between wrongful
death actions for the death of a minor and such actions for the death
of an adult, requiring in the former case that there be specified survivors
of the minor (spouse, child, or parent) as a condition precedent to
bringing the action.
Chapter 334 has eliminated the distinctions between the wrongful
death of a minor and that of an adult, and no longer requires particular
survivors in the case of a minor. Also changed is the classification of
those entitled to maintain the action. Whereas "heirs" and "dependent
parents" were formerly considered as two separate categories, there is
now one category of persons who are entitled to maintain an action for
wrongful death as "heirs" of the decedent. The first group of persons
within this category are those persons who would be entitled to succeed
to the property of the decedent by intestate succession pursuant to Division 2 (commencing with §200) of the Probate Code, although no
such person may recover damages unless he or she has suffered a pecuniary loss by decedent!s death [4 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA
LAW, Torts §790 (8th ed. 1974)].
The second group of persons
within this category are parents of the decedent, putative spouse of the
decedent, children of the putative spouse, and stepchildren of the decedent. Individuals within this latter group must establish that they were
dependent upon the decedent for support. This expanded definition of
"heirs" is expressly limited to wrongful death actions by Section 377.
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Section 2 of Chapter 334 provides that the inclusion of stepchildren
within Section 377 is intended to alter the rule of law announced in
Steed v. Imperial Air Lines, [12 Cal. 3d 115, 524 P.2d 801, 115 Cal.
Rptr. 329 (1974)], which held that a dependent stepchild of the decedent could not bring an action for wrongful death, because she was
not an "heir" under the statutory rules of intestate succession. Inclusion
of the putative spouse of the decedent appears to be a recognition of
the holding in Kunakoff v. Woods [166 Cal. App. 2d 59, 332 P.2d
773 (1958)], which allowed a putative wife who qualified as an heir
under Probate Code 201 to be considered an heir under Section 377
with standing to sue for the wrongful death of her putative husband.
Chapter 334 uses the term "putative spouse," thereby extending standing to surviving husbands. Additionally, the putative spouse no longer
needs to qualify as a statutory heir under the Probate Code, but must
only establish that he or she was dependent upon the decedent. It
should be noted that Section 377 defines a putative spouse as the survivor of a void or voidable marriage who believes in good faith that the
marriage to the decedent was valid, thereby expressly excluding meretricious relationships.
Finally, the inclusion of children of the putative spouse who were dependent upon the decedent adds a group which was not previously encompassed by Section 377. There is no requirement that such child be
related in any way to the decedent, or that he or she qualify as an heir
under the Probate Code. Such child must merely show his or her status
as a child of the surviving putative spouse and that he or she was dependent upon the decedent.
COMMENT
In Steed v. Imperial Air Lines [12 Cal. 3d 115, 524 P.2d 801, 115
Cal. Rptr. 329 (1974)], the California Supreme Court held that the
exclusion of stepchildren from the category of those entitled to bring
a wrongful death action did not amount to a denial of equal protection.
The classification was held to be a rational one, based upon an assumed
closeness in relationship, since the action was limited to statutory heirs
under the Probate Code who had suffered some injury by the decedent's
death [Id. at 124 & n.5, 524 P.2d at 806 & n.5, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 334
& n.5]. Although not applicable to the case, the court indicated that

the 1968 amendment to Section 377

[CAL. STATS.

1968, c. 766, §1,

at 1488]-which added dependent parents of the decedent to the list
of those persons entitled to sue for wrongful death-would not invalidate the heirship test, since that amendment did not purport to expand
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the term "heirs" but rather to add a second independent category of persons who could bring an action for wrongful death [Steed v. Imperial
Air Lines, 12 Cal. 3d at 121 & n.4, 524 P.2d at 804 & n.4, 115 Cal.
Rptr. at 332 & n.4 (1974)]. Since, as indicated, that amendment was
not applicable to the Steed case, the court did not pass upon its validity.
However, the court indicated that the creation of a broad class of persons
entitled to bring an action for wrongful death, where such class was
based upon injury sustained because of decedent's death rather than
upon an heirship relationship, might be an unwarranted category if it
included some persons injured by decedent's death but excluded others
[Id. at 123, 524 P.2d at 806, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 334]. By expanding
the category of heirs for purposes of Section 377 to include stepchildren
and children of a putative spouse of the decedent if such individuals
were dependent upon the decedent, the legislature appears to have substituted an injury test for the former heirship test in providing standing
to sue for wrongful death. This is apparent because such persons do
not have to qualify as intestate heirs under the Probate Code, and might
not be related in any way to the decedent. Therefore, it would seem
that the current classification system imposed by Section 377 which includes some unrelated dependents of the decedent, but excludes others
(e.g., dependent stepparents), may be violative of equal protection.
See Generally:
1) 4 WrrXN, SUMMARY OF CALiFORNmA LAW, Torts §788 (8th ed. 1974) (persons entitled to maintain an action for wrongful death).
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